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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Trends and Developments
1.

2.

Coordinated Industry Case Program/Industry Specialization Program
a.

These two initiatives focus on large cases and include an enhanced
emphaSis on international matters. The IRS recognized the need
for more expertise and concentrated efforts on specialized industry
segments and industry specific issues.

b.

The IRS has instituted teams to assist Special Trial Attorneys in
these programs that include legal, accounting, economic, and
engineering specialists;

c.

Application of the Large Business and International Division's
bUSiness-style exam process to IRS audits of high-net-worth
individuals in a new "industry group" called the Global High
Wealth Industry Group whereby the LB&I exam team uses a
holistic approach that includes examining the full web of entities
connected to a taxpayer, including international components. '

Tax Shelter Litigation
a.

3.

' Cases involving BOSS or SON of BOSS tax shelters have been
heavily litigated in Tax Court in the last few years. The Service
has aggressively pursued these marketed tax shelter cases. At
times, the differentiation between 'a tax shelter and traditional tax'
planning transaction has been blurred. Many cases for which
practitioners consider simple tax planning have been caught up in
the IRS enhanced litigation pursuits.

Forum Selection
a.

Traditionally, the majority of major tax controversies have been
litigated in the United States Tax Court. In 2010, the Tax Court's
docket caseload exceeded 29,600 cases that aggregated over $26.6
billion of disputed tax liability. Many taxpayers seek review in Tax
Court because of the less burdensome jurisdictional requirements.
Many taxpayers are not able to pay the entire disputed tax amount
prior to seeking judicial review, which is required for district court
review. '

b.

Tax Court rules and procedures generally follow a more infonnal
approach than other federal courts. In practice, the Tax Court
prefers that counsel for taxpayers and the IRS engage in infonnal
discovery and attempt to resolve factual issues without the use of
fonnal discovery. Recently, the Tax Court changed its rules
relating to discovery procedures. The changes have resulted in the
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Tax Court moving toward a more traditional federal court model
with increased use of formal discovery techniques including
requests for admissions, interrogatories, and depositions.
c.

Recent trends have shown that more major tax cases are being
decided by the Court of Federal Claims. As of May 2011, the
Court of Federal Claims had approximately 300 cases pending
before the coUrt. The average dollar amount involved in these
cases was over $12 million. This forum has issued major opinions
in recent years relating to economic substance and substance over
form doctrines. (See Part VII.D for a more detailed discussion on
the inconsistencies present in Court of Claim decisions.) Recent
major decisions include:
(1)

Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716
(2004) (Company offset $240 million gain with contingent
liabilities that had been transferred to a "litigation
management activity fund." Court found that principal
purpose of the transaction was not tax avoidance.)
(a)

The Federal Circuit (454 F. 3d 1340 (2006)) in
reviewing the case stated five principles of
economic substance:

(

(b)

(2)

(i)

A lack of economic substance is sufficient to .
disqualify the transaction without proof that
the taxpayer's sole motive is tax avoidance;

(ii)

The taxpayer's bear the burden of proof;

(iii)

The transaction must be analyzed
objectively, therefore the taxpayer's.
subjective understanding of the deal waS
irrelevant;

(iv)

The court should focus in on the transaction
which actually gave rise to the deduction;
and

(v)

Transactions which have no economic
impact on third parties bear especially close
scrutiny.

Federal Circuit reversed the lower court and'found
that the transaction lacked economic substance.

Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007)
(involving foreign currency options. Court of Federal
Claims applied the Coltec economic substance test and
2

(

found that transactions lacked economic substance and
should be disregarded for tax purposes even though it met
literal code requirements).

d.

II.

(3)

Stobie Creek Investments v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636
(2008) (involving Son of Boss with a twist. Court applied
the Coltec economic substance test and found that
transaction lacked economic substance.)

(4)

Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228
(2009) (involving lease in-lease riut transaction with a
foreign utility. Court applied the Coltec economic
substance test and found that the transaction had economic
substance and a non-tax business purposes)

The United States Distri<;t Courts saw a decrease in refund cases
filed between March 2009 and March 2010 (1,233) from the prior
period (1,420). Of the 1,349 cases for which the Courts terminated
between March 2009 and March 2010 only 21 actually began trial
proceedings.

INFORMATION GATHERING
A.

Introduction
1.

During the last few years, the IRS has made a concerted attempt to obtain
as broad a swath of client documents as possible. The environment
surrounding tax reporting and filing has changed. As a result, and in order
to properly defend a tax controversy, it is imperative for taxpayers to
understand the various information production privileges available to
them. This risk is one which cannot be ignored; increasingly, it is clear
that what you say and the thought processes and deliberations that went
iilto that statement can and will be used against you in a court of law.

2.

There are a number of privileges that may protect the deliberative process
from inadvertent or involuntary disclosure to the IRS. The most
significant privileges are the attorney-client privilege (both as to
communications with lawyers and federally enrolled agents) and the workproduct doctrine.

3.

Recent practice has identified a number of situations where clients have
been forced to disclose to the IRS and other tax authorities their candid,
honest and internal discussions of tax risks relatedto business
transactions. This forced disclosure not only provided tax auditors with a
road map, but it also gave the government ammunition to use in
challenging the company's tax position...

4.

In most cases, what caused this forced disclosure of internal tax
discussions was inadvertent - and fully avoidable. It resulted from the
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failure of company personnel to preserve privilege and confidentiality
during their early-stage discussions with third-parties. And, in several
cases, it resulted in a waiver of attorney-client privilege and attorney work
product confidentiality for the entire issue - meaning that the law
department's files became subject to discovery'.
. B.

IRS Initiatives
L

2.

C.

In the past few years, the IRS has dramatically expanded its efforts.to curb
abusive tax transactions, including corporate tax shelters. The most
notable IRS efforts include:
a.

New, expansive definitions of "tax shelters" and "reportable
transactions."

b.

New tax return disclosure requirements on taxpayers.

c.

New "reportable transaction" and list maintenance requirements on
material advisors.
.

d.

New nationally c09rdinated taX shelter examination teams.

e.

New penalty provisions.

Other expansions of IRS review of taxpayers include increased attempts to.
access data and corporate records which, traditionally, the IRS has not
sought, including:
a.

E-mails and other correspondence describing the tax benefits - and
the tax risks - of specific transactions;

b.

Internal fmancial analysis of alternative tax strategies; and·

c.

Management presentations regarding neg?tiation strategies.

d.

The IRS is also expanding efforts to access auditor workpapers,
including the increasingly detailed FAS 5 tax accruals and
valuation analysis.
.

Increased Use of Summonses (including SB/SE cases)
1.

IDRs - The IRS gathers information using multiple techniques. The IRS
will issue Information Document Request ("IDR") to the taxpayer. Either
the taxpayer or its representative routinely discuss any problems or issues
relating to providing responses to these requests with the examining agent.
If a taxpayer does not comply or cooperate with the agent, the agent has
the power to issue summons for the information requested in the original
IDR. See IRC §7602.

2.

Section 7602 limits the ability of the IRS to request documents and
4

records to only items that are relevant or material to their inquiry.
However, the standard for relevance in this regard is very low. As long as
the items requested are helpful or shed light on the correctness of the
inquiry, the request will be allowed.
3. .

D.

The IRS also will attempt to gather documents from third parties in the
course of the audit. The IRS will issue summons to third-party
recordkeepers. These third parties may include banks, brokers, attorneys,
and accountants. In most situations, the IRS will prQvide the taxpayer
notice of the issuance of a third party summons to give the taxpayer the
opportunlty to challenge the summons. However, the IRS does not have
to provide notice if it is issued in the aid of collection of an assessment or
judgment. See IRC 7609(c)(2)(D).

Attorney Client Privilege
'1.

Under the most common formulation, determining if a communication
deserves protection under the attorney-client privilege requires an an~ysis
of six separate elements -- all of which must be satisfied for the privilege
to apply. The attorney-client privilege protects:
a.
b.

. E.

Communications from a client.
. To a lawyer.

c.

Related to the rendering of legal advice.

d.'

Made with the expectation of confidentiality.

e.

Not in furtherance of a future crime or fraud.

£

As long as the privilege has not been waived.

Work Product Doctrine
1.

General Considerations
a.

Work product is NOT privilege.

b.

. Work product is based 6n notions of fairness in litigation. Courts
consider it unfair to require a party in litigation to disclose all their
thinking and strategy on a case to the other side..

c.

Work product, unlike attorney-client privilege, does not require an
attorney.

d.

In order to apply, the document or analysis at issue must be
prepared "because of' litigation rather than in the o.rdinaiy course
of business.
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· ·2.

3.

Objectively reasonable expectation of litigation
a.

Burden of proof is on the party claiming protection, and should be
documented.

b.

In Federal Tax Court, an expectation of an audit by the IRS is not
considered an objectively reasonable basis to expect litigation, and
therefore, work product protection will not attach in Tax Court. .
However, in U.S. District Court (in which federal tax claims may
·also be brought), a more liberal rule is available. See U.S. v.
Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006).

Subjective Expectation of Litigation
a.

F.

Burden of proof is on the party claiming protection, and should be
documented.

Differences Between the Work Product Doctrine and theAttorneYMClient
Privilege
1.

Unlike the attorneYMclient privilege, the work product doctrine:
a.

Is relatively new.

b.

Has a fairly modest purpose. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d .
496,500 (7th Cir. 1999); Bowman v. Brush Wellman, Inc., No. 00
C 50264, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14088 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13,2001).

c.

Is a creature of statute and ·rule.

d.

Applies to nonMlawyers.

e.

Arises only at certain times.

f.

Only protects communications made "because of' litigation.

g..

May be asserted by the client or the lawyer.

h.

May not l~t forever.

1.

May be overcome if the adversary really needs the information.

J.

Is not easily waived. 2

2 Thomas E. Spahn, Ten Differences Between the Work Product Doctrine and the AttomeYMClient
Privilege, 46 Va. Law. 45 (Oct. 19(7).
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2.

3.

G.

Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine:
a.

Does not rest on the intimacy of the attorney-client relationship -a lawyer does not even have to be involved in its creation.

b.

Doe:; not rest on the confidentiality within that intimate
relationship -- it protects such materials as pictures of accident
scenes, measurements of skid marks, interviews with strangers, etc.

c.

Does not rest on communications within that intimate
relationship -- the work product doctrine can protect materials that
have never been communicated to anyone.

d.

The work product doctrine is both narrower and broader than the
attorney-client privilege.

e.

It is narrower because: the work product doctrine only applies at
certain times (during or in anticipation of litigation); and is not
actually a privilege, but rather a quwified immunity that can be
overcome under certain circumstances.

f.

It is broader because: anyone can create work product (without a
lawyer's involvement); and work product can be shared more
easily with third parties without causing a waiver of its protection.

Lawyers and their clients considering both the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine should remember that both, either or none
may apply in certain circumstances.
a.

For instance, communications between lawyers and their clients
occurring when no one anticipates,litigation can never be work
product, but may deserve priVilege protection.

b.

Materials reflecting lawyers' communications with those other than
clients (or the lawyers' own agents) can rarely if ever be privileged,
but may well be work product -- such as notes of a witness
interview.
.

' Waiver of Work Product
1.

Whereas the attorney-client privilege is always waived by any disclosure
outside the attorney-client relationship, disclosing work product to third
parties does not automatically waive that protection. Viacom, Inc. v.
Sumitomo Corp. (In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig.), 200 F.R.D. 2l3, 221
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

2.

This difference in waiver principles between the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine sometimes means that sharing materials
protected by both 1?e attorney-client privilege and the work product
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doctrine might waive the fonner but not the latter. Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198'F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (sharing
infonnation with a public relations firm).
3.

Disclosure to third party other than an adversary generally causes a waiver
only if the disclosure makes it likely that ~e work product will "fall into
enemy hands" -- ending up with the adversary. Bowman v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., No. 00 C 50264, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14088, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 13,2001); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081,1082 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982). Sharing with friend or ally
does not waive protection. Sheets v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., No.
4:04CV00058, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27060 (W.D .. Va. Nov. 8,2005)
(holding that a personal injury plaintiff did not waive the work product
protection by sharing work product with others involved in a boating
accid~nt; noting that those to whom the plaintiff disclosed the work
product shared the plaintiff's interest in obtaining insurance coverage for
the boating accident).

4.

PRACTICE NOTE: Given this difference between the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine, it makes sense to share work product
only under a confidentiality agreement. A confidentiality agreement
'would not prevent waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but might
demonstrate that the party disclosing work.product did not increase the
chance the adversary would obtain access to the work product. Blanchard
v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 192 F.RD. 233, 237-38 (N.D~ Ill.2000).

5.

Disclosure of Work Product to Outside Auditors
a.

Courts have held that sharing protected work product with outside
auditors does not result in waiver of work product protection.
Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy. Inc., 229 F.RD. 441,
444,447,448,449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

b.

In case closely watched as one of the government's first efforts to
get tax accrual workpapers through court proceeding~ from a
fmancial services subsidiary of conglomerate Texatron, Inc. United
, States v Textron, Inc., No. 06-198T:(D.R.I. August 29,2007).
(1)

District Court Phase:' Textron Victory
(a)

.The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode
Island denied the goveinment's petition to get the
2001 tax accrual workpapers from Textron, Inc:'s
financial services subsidiary.

(b)

Facts: Textron, Inc. (Textron), a publicly traded
corporation with approximately 190 subsidiaries,
had a subsidiary that provided commercial lending
and financial services (Textron Financial Corp. 'or
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TFC) relied on Textron attorneys, private law firms,
and outside accounting firms for,advice regarding
tax matters. IRS learned that TFC had engaged in
illne "sale-in, lease-out" (SILO) transactions
involving telecommunications equipment and rail
equipment. Because the transactions were
considered to be of a type engaged in for the
purpose of tax avoidance, IRS issued more than 500
IDRs to Textron. In June 2005, the IRS manager
examining Textron's return issued an administrative
summons for all of the tax accrual work papers for
" Textron's tax year ending Dec. 29, 2001. Textron
refused to produce its tax accrual work papers
asserting that they were privileged and that the
summons was issued for an improper purpose.
During the course of an audit conducted by
Textron's independent auditor, Textron permitted
the auditor to examine the final tax accrual work
papers at issue in the case with the understanding
that the information was to be treated as
confidential.
(c)

(2)

Reasoning: The District Court at trial said
, deterinination of any tax owed must be based on
factual information, none of which is contained in
the work papers and all of which is readily available
to the IRS through the issuance of information
document requests (IDRs) and by other means. The
District Court said that, in its view, the papers
sought by the IRS would have little bearing on
calculating Textron's tax liability. "The opinions of
Textron's counsel, either favorable or unfavorable,
would have little to do with that determination, and
forced disclosure of those opinions would put
Textron at an unfair disadvantage in any dispute
that might arise with the IRS," the court found. The
District court ruled the requested documents are
protected by the work product privilege, supporting
Textron's claims. "The IRS has failed to carry the
burden of demonstratIng a 'substantial need' for
ordinary work product, let alone the heightened
burden applicable to Textron's tax accrual work
papers, which constitute opinion work product," the
court said in a 34-page opinion.

1st Circuit Phase - Government Victory (United States v.
Textron, 577 F. 3d 21 (1 st Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
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(3)

(a)

The 1st Circuit Court of Appeals held that Textron's
tax accrual workpapers were not protected from
discovery by the IRS.

(b)

Reasoning: The workpapers were independently
required by statutory and audit requirements and;
therefore, the work product privilege'did not apply.

(c)

The Court stated that unless·the document was
prepared for use in potential litigation, the Court did
not believe the work product privilege applied. Tax
accrual workpapers are prepared in support of
financial statement certification by independent
auditors, not potential litigation.

(d)

The dissent in Textron argued that the test adopted
by the majority is more narrow and restrictive than
prior precedent. The dissenting opinion saw no
reason to require a taxpayer to provide the IRS their
assessment of the likely outcome of litigation
simply because it was created for a business
purpose.

Supreme Court - In 2010, the Supreme Court denied'
Textron's petition for certiorari. (Textron v. United States,
.130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010».

c.

This new debate has caused great concern to in-house lawyers,
who find themselves pressured by outside auditors to disclose
litigation-related analyses, litigation outcome predictions, etc. -yet justifiably worry about waiving the work product protection
that would otherwise entitle the companies to withhold such
documents from the private plaintiffs against whom they are
litigating.

d.

IRS releases internal memoranda on FIN 48. "FIN 48 Disclosures
... should be considered by examiners and others when
conducting risk assessments." (Deborah Nolan, LMSB
Commissioner): The battle wages on despite. such court decisions
like the Textron decision.

e.

Since its release on July 13; 2006, FIN 48 has generated
considerable interest ·and concern.' Many taxpayers fear that the
disclosures required by FIN 48 and the workpapers prepared in
connection therewith will serve as a "roadmap" for IRS
examinations. The IRS Office of Chief Counsel has determined
that FIN 48 Workpapers are Tax Accrual Workpapers (TAW), and
are therefore subject to the IRS' current policy of restraint as .
contained in IRM 4.10.20. IRS officials have stated, however, that
10

.(

the current TAW Policy is being evaluated to ensure that it is still
appropriate in today' s environment.
f.

The memorandum captioned "FIN 48 Implications LMSB Field
Examiner's Guide," lists ten common questions and answers
related to the requirements of FIN 48. The first question, and the
one most likely on taxpayers' and IRS examiner's minds is, "Are
FIN 48 Disclosures a Roadmap for the IRS 7" The memorandum
does not answer this question with a simple ''yes'' or "no," but it is
clear from the answer that, at a minimum, IRS examiners should
use the FIN 48 disclosures to point them in the right direction. The
answer notes that FIN 48 disclosures may lack specificity, and
therefore, it may be difficult, for example, to know whether the
disclosure has a U.S. tax or foreign tax implication. Nevertheless,
the answer goes on to state, "Even with the lack of specificity, tax
.
footnotes included in fmancial statements, including FIN 48
Disclosures, should be carefully reviewed and analyzed as part of
the audit planning process.
.

.g.

The se·cond question and answer in the memorandum addresses the
impact of FIN 48 on the IRS ' TAW Policy. While the answer
states that FIN 48 Workpapers are TAWs, and therefore, subject to
the policy of restraint, FIN 48 Disclosures are another matter. "On
the other hand, FIN 48 Disclosures reported in quarterly and/or
annual financial statements, and any other public documents, are
not subject to the policy of restraint, and should be considered by
examiners and others when conducting risk assessments."

h.

A number. of the questions and answers address taxpayers'
concerns about obtaining certainty on tax issues more quickly
through closing agreements, restricted consents to extend the
statute oflimitations, and the IRS' pre-flling programs (Industry
Issue Resolution, Pre-filing Agreements, Advance Pricing
Agreements, and Compliance Audit Program) and post-flling
programs (Joint Audit Plan, LIFE, Advance Issue Resolution,
Appeals Fast Track Program, Accelerated Issue Resolution, and
Early Referral to Appeals). In this regard, the memorandum notes,
"We can remind taxpayers that candor, transparency and the right
motivationS, coupled with programs and processes we have iIi
place today.can quickly generate certainty on tax issues."

1.

Question and Answer #8. addresses the situation in which a
transaction that has closed becomes a Listed Transaction. Under
the Jobs Creation Act, the statute of limitations is extended until
one calendar year after the IRS receives proper disclosure of Listed
Transactions. In the case of a closed transaction that becomes a
Listed Transaction, the answer states that, until one year after
proper disclosure to the IRS, interest must be accrued in the P&L
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on the unrecognized tax benefit (perhaps all of the benefit because.
the "more likely than not" threshold may not have been met) under
the rules of FIN 48, and the tax benefit taken on the tax return will
never be recognizable in the financial statements. As a result, each
year the accrued interest increases and the P&L is negatively.
affected.

H.

J.

The memorandum states that LMSB has consulted FASB on this
point and FASB agrees that this is the result. The memorandum '
advises that "it may be a good practice to remind taxpayers about
this provision affecting Listed Transactions and the way they
impact on the application of FIN 48 in their fmancial st~tements."

k.

It is clear from the memoranda that the IRS is preparing itsLMSB
examiners to focus carefully on FIN 48 Disclosures. The
statement that LMSB is evaluating the policy of restraint with
respect to FIN 48 Workpapers suggests thatLMSB examiners may
be increasing their requests for FIN 48 Workpapers. LMSB has
created a "TAW Cadre whose members are available to assist with
the review of documents received in response to TAW IDRs
[information docunlent requests]. The primary objective of the
Cadre is to assist LMSB examiners in determining whether items
received fulfill the IDR, whether additional documents should be
requested, and in considering the risk assessment related to the
review of those tax accrual workpapers." .

Post Textron Decision Events on Tax Accrual Workpapers - DeloWe (United
States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F. 3d 129 (D.C. Circ. 2010))
1.

Background:
a.

To aid examining agents in the audit of taxpayers, the IRS has
increased requests for a taxpayer's tax accrual workpapers. These
papers document the taxpayer's decision-making process and
rationale for creating tax reserves for financial accounting
purposes. Taxpayers are concerned that providing these
dpcuments will provide the IRS with audit roadmap. (Similar to
the arguments against Uncertain Tax Position reporting).

an

b.

A taxpayer generally prepares the workpapers in connection With
assistance from inside and outside counsel. The workpapers
include information relating to the making of legal judgments
relating to certain positions taken on returns. The taxpayer usually
needs the assistance of counsel to properly estimate the audit risk
and, if necessary, litigation risks.

c.

Taxpayers generally assert the Work Product Privilege in their
attempts to defeat the IRS's ability to obtain these workpapers.
The Work Product Privilege prohibits discovery of "documents
12

and tangible things ... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial" when discussed with a taxpayer's representative (usually an
attorney or accountant).
(1)

This privilege finds its origin in the U.S. Supreme Court
decision Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S .. 495 (1947) (where
the Court granted protection from disclosure materials
prepared by a party "in anticipation of litigation.") The
disputed materials consisted of summaries of witness
statements gathered by an attorney during trial preparation.

(2)

.In 1970, a rule was added to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to address the issue. FRCP 26(b)(3) provides
that "a party may not discover documents and tangible
things that are prepared. in anticipation of litigation or for
trial or for another party or its representative."
.
(a)

(b)

d.

2.

The rule is different from the holding in Hickman in
. two regards. The rule does not protect from
disclosure:
(i)

intangible work product; or

(ii)

.work product prepared by non-attorneys
(this issue was not addressed in Hickman).

Courts generally apply the "because of' test to
determine if the material has been prepared in.
anticipation of litigation.

As of2009, the IRS official policy is that tax accrual workpapers
will not automatically be requested in every audit. Recent trends
have shown that the IRS is requesting these workpapers more and
more. In contrast, once a matter goes forward to the litigation
phase, the IRS routinely asks for copies of tax accrual workpapers
as part of their informal discovery.

Deloitte - D.C. Circuit - Taxpayer Victory (United States v. Deloitte LLP,
610 F. 3d 129 (D.C. Circ. 2010)).
a.

Rationale: In contrast to Textron, the D.C. Circuit focused on the
content of the materials at dispute. The D.C. Circuit determined
that Deloitte's tax accrual workpapeis contained work product·
which' includes the thoughts and opinions of counsel developed in
anticipated of litigation.
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3.

b.

The Court also stated that the disclosure of the work product to the
taxpayer's independent auditor did not constitute a waiver of the
privilege because Deloitte was not a potential adversary and a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality was expected.

c.

The IRS did not seek Supreme Court review in this 'case.

Wells Fargo - Dual Purpose Documents (District Court Minnesota)
a.

On September 1,2010, Wells Fargo & Co. asked the court to '
quash a subpoena issued to its independent auditor, KPMG LLP
relating to requests for tax accrual workpapers.
(1)

The summons asked for "any and all analyses,
computations, opinions, notes, summaries, discussiohS~ and
other documents relating to such reserves and any
footnotes. "

(2)

Wells Fargo & Co is attempting to protect from disclosure
the following items from its files and from the files of its
auditor:
(a)

Company memoranda based on advice of in-house
tax controversy attorneys identifying and evaluating
the legal merits of its UTPs and selecting a reserve
percentage b~ed on the likelihood of settlement;

(b)

Meeting agendas and emails identifying and/or
evaluating litigation risks associated with its UTPs;'
and

(c)

Spreadsheets, reports, and electronic data files
identifying UTPs with potential analysis relating to
evaluating appropriate legal tax reserve percentages
and reserve amounts.

(3)

The question for the Court is whether the work product
doctrine applies to dual purpose documents prepared by
taxpayers to support their FASB Interpretation No. 48 tax
reserves. The tax reserves would not be necessary put for
the anticipated litigation.

(4)

Government's Position - the documents were prepared in
the ordinary course of business as part of Wells Fargo's
obligations under regulatory requirements not for
anticipated litigation. ,The government also asserts that any
work product privilege was waived when Wells Fargo
provided the documents to its auditors.
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(5)

4.

III.

The District Court held a four-day evidentiary hearirig
beginning on July 25, 2011. The parties are awaiting a final
decision.

Effect ofUTP Reporting on the Tax Accrual Workpaper Issue
a.

On September 24,2010, the IRS released materials relating to·the
new reporting requirements for uncertain tax positions (UTPs)
including the final form of Schedule UTP.

b.

For 2010, private or public companies with total assets of$100
million or more that issue or are included in audited fmancial
statements and that file a Form 1120, 1120-L, or 1120-PC must file
a Schedule UTP. The schedule will be phased ill for taxpayers with
assets of less than $100 million.

c.

Schedule UTP requires filers to rank UTPs by the amount of
reserves.

d~

Schedule UTP requires a concise description of relevant facts
affecting the tax treatment of the position and infoimation to
apprise the IRS of the identity of the tax position and the nature of
the issue. The statement does not have to include the rationale for
the filing of the UTP.

e.

The IRS plans to process Schedule UTP through an established
centralized process under LB&I. This will enable LB&I to select
issues and returns for audit.

f.

It is to be seen whether the reporting requirements for Uncertain
Tax Positions will moot future disputes over tax accrual
workpapers.

IRS GIDDANCE -- WHAT DEGREE 'OF DEFERENCE AND WHEN CAN
TAXPAYERS RELY UPON IT?
A..

Six~Year Statute of Limitations - Beard; Home Concrete; Grapevine; etc.

1.

Background:
a

. Code Section 6501(a) generally provides that a valid assessment of

income tax liability may not be made more than 3 years after the
later of the date of the tax return was filed or the due date of the tax
return .
. b.

Code Section 6501 (e)(1)(A) allows a 6 year statute of limitations
on assessment when a taxpayer "omits from gross income'.' an
amount that is greater than 25% of the amount of gross income
. '.
stated in the return.
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c.

Text of Code Section 6501(e)
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) -

(1) Income taxes. In the case of any tax imposed by subtitle A(A) General rule. If the taxpayer omits from gross income an
amount properly includible therein and(i)

such amount is in excess of25 percent of the amount of
gross income stated in the return, or

(ii)

such amount(I) is attributable to one or more assets with respect to
which information is required to be reported under
section 6038D (or would be so required if such
section were applied without regard to the dollar
threshold specified in subsection (a) thereof and
without regard to any exceptions provided pursuant
to subsection (h)(I) thereof), and

(II) is in excess of $5,000,
the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such
tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after
the return was filed.
(B)

Determination of gross income'. For purposes of
subparagraph (A)(i)

in the case of a trade or business, the term "gross
income" means the total of the amounts received or
accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such
amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to
diminution by the cost of such sales or services; and

(ii)

in determining the amount omitted from gross income,
there shall not be taken into account any amount which
is omitted from gross income stated in the return if such
amount is disclosed ,in the return, or in a statement
attached to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise
.the SecretarY of the nature and' amount of such item.

(C) Constructive dividends. If the taxpayer omits from gross
income an amount properly includible therein under section
951(a), the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for
the collection of such tax may be done without assessing, at
any time within 6 years after the return was filed.
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2.

Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958)
a.

Background: Real estate developer that miscalculated profits from
the sale of realty by erroneously including an excessive itein of
cost of the realty.

b.

Issue: Under the predecessor statute to 6501(e), did the taxpayer
omit from gross income some taxable item?

c.

Holding: The extended period of limitations in applies to situations .
where specific income receipts have been "left out" in the
computation of gross income, and not something put in and
overstated.

d.

Rationale (1)

3.

1954 Code Changed/Clarified Code Section 275(c) (now 6501(e))
a.

4.

When a taxpayer omits an item, the IRS is at a
disadvantage in detecting errors. In such cases the return
on its face provides no clued to the existence of an omitted
item~ However, in an overstated basis issue the face of the
return the Commissioner is not at a disadvantage because
the basis is disclosed.

Congress made modifications to the 3-year/6-year issue in ..
response to 'court decisions. In each instance, Congress limited the
6:-year statute to cases in which the taxpayer left out items of
income.
(1),

New Heading on Code Subsection- "Substantial Omission
ofItems" replaced "Omission fromGross Income."

. (2)

Exception from6-year statute if adequate disclosure is
provided.

(3)

Redefmed gross profit as including only the revenue side.

IRS Litigation Position: Treasury Regulation 301.6501(e)-I(e) (T.D.
9511).
a.

Background: In December 2010, the IRS issued final regulations
which held that an understated amount of gross income resulting
from an overstatement of unrecovered cost or other basis is an
omission of gross income for purposes of the 6-year period for
assessing tax.
.
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'(I)

(2)

b.

IRS disagrees that the holding of Colony applies to Section
6501 (e)(1 )(A). The IRS takes the position that when
Congress enacted the 1954 Code, it limited what became
the holding of Colony under the 1934 Code.
The Reguhltions provide that any overstatement of basis
that results in an understatement of gross income under
Code Section 61(a) is an omission from gross income under
Code Section 6501 (e)(l)(A).

Validity of Regulations under Mayo (Mayo Foundation For
Medical Residents V. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
(1)

On January 11,2011, the Supreme Court addressed the
validity of Treasury regulations dealing with employment
taxes for medical residents and other student-employees.,

. (2)

Issue: Whether medical residents are exempt from FICA
taxes based on the exception for service performed in the
employ of a school, college, or University if such service is
performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly
attending classes at such school, college, or university.

(3)

The TreasUry regulations promulgated in 19~ 1 provide 'that
the exception only applies to students who work for their
schools as incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a
course of study. See Treas. Reg. §31.3121(b)(10)-~(d).

(4)

In 2004, Treasury amended the regulations so that the
exception only applies only when the educational aspect
predominates over the service aspe<;t. Specifically, student
working a full-time schedule (scheduled more than 40
hours a week) are not within the exception.

(5)

The Mayo Foundation and the University of Minnesota
challenged the validity of the amended regulation. The
. District Court agreed in part relying on the National
Muffier decision (National Muffier Dealers Ass'n Inc. v.
United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979)). (Mayo Found. For
Med. Res. v. United States, 503F. supp. 2d 1164 (D. Minn.
2007).
.

(6)

However, the 8th Circuit r~versed the lower court ruling
rmding that the regulation was valid under the Chevron
standard (Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources
Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) (Mayo Found.
For Med. Res. v. United States, 568 F. 3d 675 (8 th Cir.
2009).
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(

(7)

c.

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the circuit court
opinion (131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) and held:
(a)

Chevron, not National Muffler controls;

(b)

Section 3121(b)(10) is silent or ambiguous as to the
de:firiition of the student exception; and

(c)

The amended regulations reasonably interpret
section 3121(b)(10)..

Application of Mayo/Chevron.
(1)

Determination
(a)

(b)

Step 1 - Did Congress have an intention on the
precise question at issue.? If so, that intent is
controlling. .If the regulation takes a different
position, the regulation is invalid.
(i)

. Ask -- Is the statutory provision ambiguous?

(ii)

Ask - Can the judge look to other guidance
to determine Congressional intent such as
legislative history or should the focus be
solely on the text of the statute?

Step 2 - If Congress did not have an intention on
the precise question at issue, then a government ,
agency can adopt ,any reasonable interpretation. '
(i)

(2)

5.

Ask - Is the regulation reasonable
interpretation of the statute?

Generally, for a taxpayer to be successful in challenging the
validity of a regulation, the taxpayer must win at Step 1. If
the statutory provision is found to be ambiguous, the
burden on the taxpayer to show that the interpretation is
unreasonable is quite steep. However, it is not impossible
to convince a, court that the agency determination is
unreasonable.

Supreme Court -- Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States
(Docket No. 11-139).
a.

On September 27,2011, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Many people were surprised that the Supreme Court chose to select
this case as opposed to the taxpayer's petition in Beard v. '
Commissioner. Beard had been decided earlier and had the
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support of the u.s. Justice Department. However, Home Concrete
addressed a wider range of issues in its opinion including the
validity of the Treasury regulations (T.D. 9511) issued under
Section 6501(e).
b.

c.

Issue Before the Supreme Court:
(1)

Whether an understatement of gross income attributable to
an overstatement of basis in sold property is a gross.
omission that triggers the six-year assessment period.

(~)

Whether final regulations promulgated by Treasury are
subject to j1,ldicial deference.

Facts:
(1)

Robert Pierce and Stephen Chandler owned Home Oil and
Coal Company. They pl~ed to sell the business. Prior to
engaging in a sales transaction, the two. owners participated
in a variety of transactions including short sales of U.S.
Treasury Bonds. These transactions were designed to
increase their basis in certain assets and decrease their tax
liability upon the actual sale of the business.

(2)

When they-initiated the sales of the u.S. Treasury bonds,
they transferred the short sale proceeds and margin cash to
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC ("LLC") as capital
contributions. The contributions created an outside basis in
the LLC. When the LLC closed the short sale transactions
by purchasing and returning aimost identical U.S. Treasury
bonds to the open market.

(3)

Home Oil & Coal Company transferred all of its business
assets to the LLC as a capital contribution.

(4)

. Pierce and Chandler transferred percentages of their
respective partnership interest in the LLC to Home Oil· as a
capital contribution.

(5)

LLC sold substantially all of its assets to a third-party
purchaser.

(6)

On its 1999 tax return, the LLC made a Section 754
election to adjust or step up its inside basis to equal the
taxpayer's outside basis in the LLC. The LLC then
adjUsted its inside basis and as a result reported a modest
.
gain on the sale of its assets.
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(7)

On September 7, 2006, the IRS issued a Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustment ("FP AA"). In the FP AA, the
IRS did not allow the basis step-up, which resulted in a
. substantial increase in the LLC's gain on the sale of the
assets.
(a)

d.

(8)

Home Concrete paid the amount due and filed a refund suit
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina·

(9)

The Taxpayers alleged that the FPAA was barred by the
Code Section 6501(a) 3-year limitations period.

District ColJrl's Holding (Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. U.S.
(E.D. NC 2008) - Held in Favor of the IRS:
. (a)

e.

The IRS rational for the adjustment was that the
partnership was formed and availed of solely for
purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating
basis in the partnership interest.

Holding: Granted partial summary judgment in the
IRS's favor.

(b)

Rationale: Held that where a taxpayer overstates
basis, and as a result, leaves an amount out of gross
income, the taxpayer omits an amount from gross
income for purposes of Code Sec 6501 (e)(1 )(A).

(c)

Therefore, the 6-year statute applied, not the 3-year.

Fourth Circuit's Holding (Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v.
United States, 634 F. 3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011) - Held in Favor of the
Taxpayer:
(a)

Holding: Overruled District Court and found that.
the 3-year statute of limitations not the 6-year
statute applied, which meant that the FPAA was
untimely.

(b)

Rationale: Held that the Supreme Court holding in .
Colony continued to apply to Code Section
6501(e)(1)(A) and that an overstated basis in
property is not an omission from gross income that
extends the period of limitation.

(c)

Home Concrete's overstated basis in the short sale
proceeds did not trigger the 6-year statute of
limitations.
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f.

(d)

The Colony decision construed the phrase "omits
from gross income" separate from being dependent·
on the taxpayer's identity as a trade or business
selling goods or services. The language of the
statute that was at issue in Colony is identical to the
language at issue in Home Concrete.

(e)

The 4th Circuit held that because the Treasury
Regulation at issue was interpreting language that
the Supreme Court held to be unambiguous when it
decided Colony, the regulation was not entitled to
controlling deference.

Supreme Court Revie~: Effect of Mayo
(1)

·In Mayo, the Supreme Court gave the governme~t wide
latitude when regulations are issued.. There is confusion
regarding how broad these powers extend. Can the IRS do
whatever it wants when it issues regulations? Did Congress
intend to permit the IRS to issue retroactive regulations
with such a bi:oad scope when used to bolster a litigation
position?

(2)

Does Colony still apply post Chevron/Mayo?

(3)

Step 1 - -Will the Supreme Court find the statute
ambiguous?
(a)

. (4)

Step 2 ~ If it is ambiguous, are the retroactive regulations
reasonable?
(a)

g.

In aiding their determination, will the Supreme
Court look past the statutory provision to legislative
history and Congressional reports?

Do the regulations meet the Administrative
. Procedures Act" standards - did Treasury provide
adequate explanation for the regulations?

Taxpayer's Response to Government's Certiorari Petition
(1)

Argued that legislative changes to section 6501(e) have
never overruled Colony, which remains good law becaUSe
it is not limited to goods or services.

(2) .

Argued that the final regulations are not applicable even if
the six-year statute applies because the retroactive nature of
the regulations violates due process and does not deserve
judicial deference.
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6.

Status of Other Cases a.

Court of Appeals - Government Wins
Seventh Circuit- Beard v. Commissioner, 633 F. 3d 616
(7 th Circ. 2011).

(1)

(2)

Found Colony not to be controlling, did not reach
issue of deference to the regulations.

(b)

No mention of Mayo, even though decided and
opinion written after Mayo.

Tenth Circuit - Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.
3d 1362 (Fed. Cir~ 2009).

(3)

(a)

Applied Mayo to permit deference for issued
regulations notwithstanding pending litigation.

(b)

Note that litigation in the Federal Circuit relating to
a prior tax year, Salman Ranch (573 F. 3d 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2009) won on the same issue. The 10th
Circuit said that the "rules"ohad changed in the
interim and held that collateral estoppel did not
apply.

District of Columbia - Intermountain Insurance Services of
Vail, LLC v. Comm'r. 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12476 (D.C.
Cir.2011).
(a)

Found statute to be ambiguous by·exploring Colony
decision and legislative history.

(b)

Applied Mayo to permit deference for issued
regulations notwithstanding pending litigation.

Federal Circuit - Gra:gevine Im:gorts~ Ltd. v. United States,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14144 (Fed: Cir. 2011).

(4)

°

b.

(a)

(a)

Statutory language was ambiguous. Treasury
regulations were reasonable interpretation of the
statute.

(b)

Relied solely on Chevron and Brand X. Mayo not
mentioned.

°

Court of Appeals - Taxpayer Victories
(1)

Fourth Circuit - Home Concrete (See above).
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0

(a)
(2)

Fifth Circuit - Burks v. United States, 633 F. 3d 347 (5 th
Cir.2011).
'
'
(a)

(3)

B.

Found statute unambiguous.

Found statute unambiguous, Mayo not applicable.
Assuming statute ambiguous, court expressed
concern over the retroactive litigation position of
the new regulations asserted by the IRS.

Ninth Circuit - Bakersfield Energy Partners. LP v.
Comm'r, 568 F. 3d 767 (~th Cir. 2009).
(a)

Case decided prior to the issuance of the new
Treasury regulation. Also, the case was decided
before the Mayo decision.

(b)

Held that Colony controlled the case and that
overstated basis was not a gross omission.

(c)

Stated that the IRS may issue regulations that run .
contrary to a Supreme Court holding provided that
the statute is ambiguous and the regulations are
reasonable (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs. , 545 U.S. 967(2005)).
However, they were bound by'the decision in
Colony.
'

Non-precedential guidance - e;g., Directives. FAQs;
1.

Increasingly Utilized; Examples include:
a.

Success-Based Fees - On July 26,2011, LB&I issued a directive
directing agents not to pursue a taxpayer's treatment of successbased fees paid or incurred in a transaction described in § 1.263(a)5(e)(3) of the Income Tax Regulations irrtaxable years ended
before April 8, 2011, where the taxpayer's ooginal return position
is to capitalize such fees to the transaction in an amount of at least
30 percent of the total success-based fees incurred by the taxpayer
With the respect to the transaction.

b.

. Economic Substance Doctrine - On July 15,2011 LB&I issued
internal directive with guidelines related to when it is appropriate
to apply the codified economic substance doctrine and penalties.

c.

Gift Tax on 501(c)(4) Contributions - On July 7,2011 LB&I
issued an internal,directive without guidance, directing agents not
to pursue gift tax audits related to 501(c)(4) Contributions until
further guidance is provided.
24

2.

d.

Strict Liability Economic Substance Doctrine Penalty - On
September 14, 2010, LMSB issued a directive requiring that any
assertion of the strict liabiHty penalty be approved at the DFO
level.

e.

Gain Recognition Agreements - On July 26; 20.10, LMSB issued·a
memorandum titled "Directive on Examination Action With
Respect to Certain Gain Recognition Agreements" with a
procedure for taxpayers that timely filed a document that
"purports" to be. a GRA regarding an initial transfer but does not
satisfy the requirements of reg. section 1.367(a)-8(c)(2).·

f.

Tiered Issue Industry Director Directives agents on how to examine tiered issues.

4.

IV.

guidance to

Musfbe Adhered to By IRS Personnel
a.

3.

~rovide

IRS personnel are expected to follow these directives - "LMSB
Examiners are expected to follow guidelines and instructions
provided in LMSB Directives. If the Directive is jointly issued
with another operating division, then examiners of both divisions
must follow the Directive." IRM 4.51.2.6(5).

Taxpayers Cannot Rely On Them
a.

Directives Constitute Infonnal Guidance

b.

Generally only administrative in nature; Does not address IRS
legal position

c.

Not recognized as authoritative
(1)

For penalty purposes - Directives are not specifically
identified·in reg. section 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) as authority
that constitute "substantial authority" for penalty purposes.

(2)

For Circular 230 purposes.

Can Sometimes Mutate Into Proposed Regulations.

TAX OPINIONS AND PENALTIES POST-CANAL
A.

Canal C01J?oration (Canal Com. v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010))
1.

Issue - Issue was whether anti-abuse regulations of Treas. Reg. §1.752-2G)
applied to a debt-fmanced distribution transaction.
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2.

Facts:

a

b.

3.

Fonnation of Partnership - Georgia Pacific (GP) and WISCO (a
subsidiary of Chesapeake) fonned Georgia-Pacific Tissue LLC
(LLC) as the vehicle for a joint venture. GP and WISCO treated
the LLC as a partnership for tax purposes. Both partners
contributed the assets of their respective tissue businesses to the
LLC. GP transferred to the LLC its tissue business assets with an
agreed value of $376.4 million in exchange for a 95-percent '
interest in the LLC. WISCO contributed to the LLC all of the
assets of its tissue business with an agreed value of $775 million in
exchange for a 5-percent interest in the LLC.
' Debt-Financed Distribution - The LLC borrowed $755.2 million
from Bank of America (BOA) on the same day it received the
contributions from GP and WISCO. The LLC immediately
transferred the loan proceeds to Chesapeake's (WISCO's parent)
bank account as a special cash distribution.

c.

Guarantee and Indemnification - OP guaranteed payment of the
BOA loan, and WISCO agreed to indemnify GP for any principal
payments GP might have to make under its guaranty.

d.

LLC's Assets - The LLC had approximately $400 million in net
worth based on the parties' combined initiai contribution of assets
($1.151 billion) less the BOA loan ($755:2 million), and it had a
debt to equity ratio of around 2, to 1. The LLC assumed most of
WISCO's'liabilities. Chesapeake and WISCO both indemnified GP
and held it hannIess for any costs and claims that it might incur
with respect to any retained liabilities of WISCO.

e.

WISCO's Assets - WISCO's assets following the transaction
included an intercompany note with a face value of$151 million
and a corporate jet worth approximately $6 million. WISCO had a
net worth, excluding its LLC interest, of approximately $157
million. This represented 21 percent of its maximum exposure on
the indemnity.

Opinion - The Court determined that the anti-abuse rules ofTreas. Reg.
§1.752-2G) applied to the debt-fmanced distribution transaction.

a.

Legal Background
(1)

Contributions and Distributions to Partnerships are Tax
Free - The Court first recognized that contributions to and
distributions from partnerships are generally tax-free
events. See generally IRC §§721, 731.
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b.

(2)

Disguised Sale Rule - Section 707(a)(2)(B), however,
provides the 'disguised sale rule' exception to this general
rule. There, when a partner contributes property to a
partnership and soon thereafter receives a distribution of
money or other consideration from the partnership, a
disguised sale, as opposed to a tax-free distribution, may be
deemed to have occurred.

(3)

Debt-Financed Distribution Exception to Disguised Sale
Rule - The taxpayer in Canal argued that the distribution to
Chesapeake was not a disguised sale because itmet one of
the exceptions to the disguised sale rules - the DebtFinanced Distribution Exception. Under this exception,
certain debt-fmanced distributions are excluded in
detennining whether a partner received "money or other
consideration" for disguised sale purposes. This includes a
partner's share ofa partnership's recourse liabilities,
provided the partner bears the economic risk of loss
associated with that liability.
.

(4)

Anti-Abuse Rule - The anti-abuse rule provides that a
partner's obligation to make a payment on a partnership's
recourse liabilities may be disregarded if (1) the facts and
circumstances indicate that a principal purpose of the'
arrangeIllent between the parties is to eliminate the
partner's risk of loss or to create a facade of the partner's
b~aring the economic risk of loss with respect to the
obligation, or (2) the facts and circumstances of the
transaction evidence a plan to circumvent or avoid the
obligation.

Court's Analysis
(1)

Indemnity Limited Risk - The Court first determined that
the indemnification ofthe.OP guarantee of the LLC debt
limited the risk of loss to only WISCOs remaining assets Chesapeake bore no risk of loss. .

(2)

WISCO's Assets- The Court determined that WISCO's
assets were minimal relative to the indemnified amount and
as a result the "agreement to indemnify OP's guaranty
lacked economic substance and afforded no real protection
to OP."

(3)

Conclusion - The anti-abuse rules applied, effectively
rejecting application of the debt-fmanced distribution to the
disguised sale rule.
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B.

Penalty - Court also considered whether a section 6662 penalty applied to the
transaction. .
1. .

2.

Raised During Litigation:.... Although the assertion of a penalty to the
transaction was not unique, the manner in which it was fIrst raised was.
Rather than the penalty being asserted in the Notice, the penalty was fIrst
raised during the litigation.
a.

Ability to Raise New Issues in Tax Court- The IRS may raise new
issues during litigation in Tax Court that are not present in the
Notice.

b.

Tax Court Chief Judge Colvin's Remarks - Commenting on the
Canal case in oral remarks made at the 2011 ALI-ABA course
entitled How To Handle a Tax Controversy at theIRS & in Court:
From Administrative Audit Through Litigation on September 16,
2011 in Washington, DC, Chief Judge of the Tax Court, John O .
.Colvin acknowledged that the Goven'nnent is not precluded from
raising new issues during litigation that were not addressed in the .
Notice, including penalties.

c.

Burden of Proof - When the Government raises a new issue during
litigation,the burden of proof generally falls to the Government
with respect to those new issues.

Reliance on Experts - Court rejected reasonable reliance oD. accounting
fIrm's 'should' opinion.
a.

Fee - Court suggested that the $800,000 flat fee paid for the
opinion indicated that the advice therein was unreasonable. In .
making this suggestion, the Court found that the draft of the·
opinion submitted at trial contained typographical errors, was
disorganized and was incomplete, and that as a r~sult it must have
been hastily drafted. In.describing why a should opinion was
issued, the c.oi:rrt·asserted that "The only explanation that makes
sense to the Court is that no lesser level of comfort would have
commanded the $800,000 fIxed fee that Chesapeake paid for the
opinion."
.

b. .

Legal Reasoning - Court determined that ''the opinion was riddled
with questionable conclusions and unreasonable assumptions."

c.

Court's Conclusion - Based on what it found to be questionable
conclusions and unreasonable assumptions, the court concluded
. that "Chesapeake's tax position did not warrant a "should" opinion
because of the numerous assumptions and dubious legal
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conclusions in the haphazard draft opinion that has been admitted
into the record. Further, we fmd it inherently tinreasonable for
Chesapeake to have relied on an analysis based on the specious
legal assumptions.'~
d.

v.

Personal Identification of Opinion Drafter - The Court singled-out
and identified by name and employer the drafter of the opinion
issued to Chesapeake.

APPEALS -- CHANGES IN COORDINATION OF TECHNICAL ISSUES

A.

Practitioners Concerns: Practitioners continue to be concerned about Appeals'
coordination of tax issues along with other originating functions at IRS.
1.

B.

, C.

Although more subtle than a direct violation of ex parte prohibitions,
coordination jeopardizes the appearance of Appeals independence given
the level of interaction.

IRS Response: IRS appears to recogriize' these concerns and may be attempting to '
mollify practitioners concerns in several ways.
'
,
1.

IRS has announced that Appeals will no longer formally sit on issue
management teams.

2.

Commenting on Appeals' coordination of technical issues at the 2011
ALI-ABA course entitled How To Handle a Tax Controversy at the IRS &
in Court: From Administrative Audit Through Litigation on September 15,
2011 in Washington, DC~ National Director Of Appeals, Chris Wagner,'
stated that there had been no new issues identified for technical
coordination during FY 2011 and that appeals had withdrawn 18 issues
from the coordinated technical guidance list (which requires the
concurrence of an Appeals Technical Guidance Coordinator to approve
the terms of settlement).

Appeals - Ex Parte
1.

Ex Parte Background
a.

Sectioi11001(a) ofRRA 1998 directs IRS commissioner to ensure:
"an independent appeals function within the Internal Revenue
Service, including the prohibition in the plan of ex parte
communications between appeals officers and other Ihternal
Revenue Service employees to the extent that such
communications appear to compromise the independence of the
appeals, officers."
(1)

Comports with Appeals' Mission - This comports with
Appeals' fundamental mission ''to resolve tax
controversies, without litigation, on a basis which is fair
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and impartial to both the Government and the taxpayer and
in a manner that will enhance voluntary compliance and
public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the
Service." Internal Revenue Manual 8.1.1.1(2) (2003).
b.

c.

The current ex parte guidelines are contained in Rev. Proc. 200043, which fmalized rules ftrst proposed in Notice 99-50.
(1)

Purpose of Rev. Proc. 2000-43 - Approach taken therein is
to "accommodate the overall interests of tax administration,
while preserving operational features that are vital to
Appeals case resolution processes within the structure of
the IRS and ensuring more open lines of communication
between Appeals and the taxpayer/representative." Rev.
Proc. 2000-43, §2.·
.

(2)

Protect Appeals Independence - Guidelines are intended to
preclude written or oral ex parte communications between
Appeals and originating functions that could jeopardize the
appearance of App~als' independence.

(3)

Substantive Communications Only - Communications that
are ministerial, administrative, or procedural in nature are
not precluded by the Guidelines..

(4)

Reasonable Opportunity to Participate - Communications
are not ex parte if the taxpayer is provided a "reasonable
opportunity" to be present.

(5)

Enforcement/Sanctions - Neither Congress in Section
1001(a) of the RRA 1998, nor Rev. Proc. 2000-43 provide
for any form of sanctions when ex parte violations occur.

IRS' misperception of, and internal procedures to handle, ex parte
guidelines jeopardize Appeals' independence.
(1)

AdministrativelMinisterial - IRS classiftes ex parte
communications as administrative or ministerial when in
reality they may be at least partially substantive.

(2)

Harmless Error - IRS asserts communications result in
harmless error.

(3)

Good Faith - IRS asserts communications are made in
good faith (Le., they are intended as factual development)

(4)

Lack of Procedures and Processes - No·procedure for
disclosures to occur, and no process for when a disclosure.
does occur. . '
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(

2.

Notice 2011-62 - On July 19,2011, the IRS proposed for public comment
updates to the Appeals ex parte guidelines contained in Rev. Proc. 200043.
.
a.

Convert the guidelines into narrative format from question-andanswer format.

b.

Incorporate much of the guidance issued in Rev. Proc. 2000-43.

c.

Adopts a series of guiding principles that, in theory, are designed
to help with the interpretation and understanding of the ex parte
restrictions.

d.

New and Continuing CaUses for Concern:
(1)

Little Taxpayer~Favorable Change - Little in the new
guidance provides for new restrictions or rules that favor .
taxpayers. Old concerns remain, and additional new
concerns have arisen.

(2)

Self-Enforcement - No procedures have been established .
by which a taxpayer can inquire or test whether an
improper ex parte communication has occurred, nor are any
remedies established for violations. Taxpayers should
continue to be vigilant in inquiring as to potential
prohibited communications and in requesting to participate
in all communications of which they are given advance
notice.

(3)

Chief Counsel Field Attorney Communications - Appeals'
communications with Chief Counsel field attorney advising
the originating IRS function is an ex parte communication
only if the field attorney "personally" advised or advocated
on the issue. Whether this was the case now dependent on
an internal assessment (one not likely to be shared with the
taxpayer) of the "extent and nature of the field attorney's
involvement." This is a change from the old rules of Rev.
Proc. 2000-43 in which Appeals was not permitted to·
communicate "ex parte regarding an issue in a case pending
before them with Counsel field attorneys who have
previously provided advice on that issue in the case to the
IRS employees who made the determination Appeals is
reviewing. "

(4)

Chief Counsel Recommendations of Settlement Ranges New guidelines state that Appeals officers are responsible
for independently evaluating the strengths and weaknesses
. of the specific issues in the case and need not follow
Counsel's advice. This is a departure from the. stronger
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language in prior guidelines which provided that "Counsel
attorneys will not provide advice that includes
recommendations of settlement ranges- for an issue in a case
pending before Appeals or for the case as a whole."

VI.

TEFRA LITIGATION
A.

BUSH v. U.S., 108 AFTR 2d 2011-5941 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

B.

Issue in Bush - Whether Government was required to issue deficiency notices
before making post-settlement partner assessments stemming from partnership
losses and at-risk adjustments.

C.

Facts ,- Two cases were consolidated for trial and considered in tandem on
Appeal.

D.

1.

Taxpayers were part of a partnership for which the IRS had issued FPAAs
for the 1983-1986 years. While Tax Court proceedings related to those
FPAAs were ongoing, taxpayers settled with the IRS by,entering into
closing agreements.

2.

The closing agreements expressly stated that they did not make any
adjustments to partnership items. The agreements addressed the right to
claim partnership losses on individual tax returns. The agreements
provided that the settling partners were only entitled to 'claim partnership
losses to the extent of their "at risk" amount. They also contained
, stipulations as to how to calculate the exact dollar amount for each settling
partner that was "at risk" for the relevant tax years. Once these
agreements were executed, the Tax Court dismisse~ the taxpayers from
, the partnership proceediD.gs.

3.

In 2000, th¢ IRS issued Notices of Adjustment for the taxpayers' 1985,
1986, and 1987 tax returns. The Notices disallowed a significant portion
of the losses the Bushes had claimed connected to the two partnerships. '
Two weeks later, the IRS assessed the taxpayers for those amounts. The
assessed amounts were based on the calculations contained in the closing
agreements. At no point did the IRS issue a Notice of Deficiency related
to the assessed amounts.

4.

The taxpayers paid the assessed tax and interest and two years later
initiated refund proceedings with the IRS seeking to recover that payment
,on grounds that the IRS failed to provide them deficiency notices. The IRS
denied their claims, and the taxpayers filed suit in the Court of Federal
Claims;

Procedural History
1.

Court of Federal Claims - The Court of Federal Claims sided with the
government. It held that the post-settlement adjustments were
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"computational adjustments" as that tenn is defined in the Tax Code and
that none of the Tax Code provisions requiring a Notice of Deficiency
applied because of the computational nature of the adjustment.
2.

E.

VII.

First Federal Circuit Opinion':'" A divided panel affmned the Court of
Federal Claims, but on different grounds. The Federal Circuit reasoned
that the adjustments were not "computational adjustments" but instead the
failure to provide notice was hannless under the federal hannless error
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111.
.

En Banc Federal Circuit Opinion·
1.

The Federal Circuit adopted the position of the Court of Federal Claims.
The Court found that "[a]fter the settlement, there was nothing to do other
than plug numbers into a fonnula to determine any change in tax liability."
The Taxpayer's arguments that: (1) such a holding impermissibly widened
the purview of computational adjustments, (2) such a holding would
render the second sentence of·I.R.C. § 6231(a)(6) (the definition of .
"computational adjustment") superfluous, and (3) such a holding
conflicted with regulations on computational adjustments were
unpersuasive to the Court.
.

2.

The Federal Circuit also addressed the Taxpayer's argument that the atrisk amounts determined by the settlements involved partner-level factual
detenninations that triggered the notice requirement. In so doing, the·
Federal Circuit again agreed with·the Court of Federal Claims that in the
cases at bar, while the at-risk amount may have been affected items with a
nonpartnership component, there were no partner-level determinations..
As a resUlt, "all that remained after the settlements was to apply the values
from the taxpayers' returns.to the stipulated computations in the settlement
agreement and directly assess the tax. There was no need to collect any
additional infonnation from the taxpayers or make any factual
determinations." This militated against the need for a Notice of
Deficiency.

TEFRA LITIGATION - PENALTIES / SALA V~ U.S., 613 F. 3d 1249 (10TH CIR.
2010)

A.

Issue in Sala - Whether Government Was entitled to offset excess interest
payments due to taxpayer with Section 6662 penalty owed but not assessed where
overpayment did not exist and where, in any event, taxpayer had filed a qualified
amended return.
.

B.

Facts
1.

In 2000, taxpayer realized more than $60 million in income related to the
sale of stock options. Taxpayer invested all but $9 million of this income
in fixed income assets. The remaining $9 million was invested in a
foreign currency investment program.
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2.

The $9 million foreign currency investment resulted in the acquisition of
24 foreign 'currency options, consisting of both long and short positions.
The net cost was approximately $725,000.

3.

In November, 2000, taxpayer fonned Solid Currencies, Inc. {"Solid" or
"Solid Currencies"}-a Delaware S Corporation in which taxpayer was
the sole shareholder. Taxpayer then transferred the 24 options, plus
approximately $8 million in cash, to Soli<;l and then from Solid to
Deerhurst Investors, GP, in exchange for a partnership interest. Deerhurst
Investors, GP was liquidated prior to December 31, 2000.

4.

Upon liquidation ofDeerhurstGP, Solid received a share of the proceeds.
Solid transferred its share of the Deerhurst GP proceeds to a different
en~ity where the funds continued to be used forinvestment purposes
through 2004.

5.

Taxpayer's 2000 return reported an ordinary loss from a trade or business
of $60,000,000: This loss was achieved by disregarding short options as
liabilities for purposes of establishing partnership basis. Thus, upon
transfer of the 24 foreign currency options from taxpayer to Solid and then
to Deerhurst GP, Solid's basis in Deerhurst GP was increased by the value
of the long options, but was not offset by the cost of th'e short options.

6.

Upon liquidation of Deerhurst GP, Solid received a portion of Deerhurst
GP's liquidated assets equal to the proportionate size of Solid's basis. Solid
claimed to have received approximately $8 million in cash and two
foreign currency contracts. Under the Tax Code, the foreign currency
contracts were considered to be "property" at transfer. The value of the
foreign exchange contracts distributed to Solid, therefore, was claimed to
be approximately $61 million-$69 million (Solid's original basis in
, Deerhurst GP) less the $8 million in cash. When Solid sold the foreign
currency contracts, its loss was equal tO,the $61 million dollar value of the
contracts, offset by any profit received from their sale. According to
Solid's 2000 tax return, t4e combined loss on the foreign currency
contracts was approximately $60,000,000.

7.

In November 2003, taxpayer filed a fonn 1040X amending his 2000
return. The amended return reported the same income amounts as the
original return, but did not report the approximate $60,000,000 loss
previously attributed to Solid Currencies. Taxpayer paid the resulting
approximately $26 million in taxes, interest, and penalties. On or about
June 18, 2004; the IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency to taxpayer, asserting
he owed additional taxes in the amount of $22,204 due to the disallowance
of $56,071 of losses taxpayer reported as attributable to Solid Currencies.
The Notice of Deficiency also asserted an accuracy-related penalty in the '
amount of $4,400.80 for tax year 2000.
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8:

C.

In September 2004, taxpayer filed another form 1040X for the 2000 tax
year reclaiming the loss attributable to Solid Currencies and claiming a
refund due of $23,727,630.

District Court Opinion - Sala v. U.S., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (DC CO 2008).

1.

For a variety of reasons not particularly relevant to the penalty issues
herein involved, the District Court ruled that the currency program giving
rise to the tax losses that Petitioner had entered into was a valid
transaction, thereby sustaining the tax losses.

2.

With respect to the accuracy-related penalty, the District Court determined
that the penalty was inapplicable for two reasons:
a. .

First, the court determined that because the transaction giving rise
to the loss was valid, there was effectively no underpayment to
which the penalty could have attached.

b.

More interestingly, the court went on to state that "Even if
[taxpayer] did underpay his 2000 taxes, however, the Government
is not entitled to a penalty if [taxpayer] filed a "qualified amended
return." 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-2(c)(2)." Such a filing would fail to
meet the standards of a qualified amended return, however, if the
Government had initiated an investigation of the taxpayer prior to
the filing, or initiated an investigation of the shelter organizer. The
Court determined that although investigation of the shelter
promoter had been initiated by the, IRS, the investigation did not
relate to the particular shelter at issue in the Sala case. As such,
the'qualified amended return filed by the taxpayer was valid, and .
even if a deficiency existed, an accuracy related penalty would be
. inappropriate.

an:

3.

Circuit'Court Opinion - Sala v. U.S., 613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) ..

a.

On Appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the District Court was overturned .
on the grounds that the underlying transaction lacked economic
, substance and a business purpose.

b.

Despite being overturned, the Circuit Court included.afootriote
indicating that ''the district court ruled Sala was entitled to a refund
of more than $1.5 million in interest payments he made relating to
his 2000 taxes and the Government represents to this court that it
does not appeal this ruling. Neither does the Government seekto
overturn the district court's ruling that it may not offsetthis refund
with an accuracy related penalty. Accordingly, our decision has no
affect on either of these aspects of the dis~ct court's judgment."
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Thus, despite the District Court's primary holding being
overturnedy it appears the penalty discussion related to the filing of
a qualified amended return, and the existence of a non-transactionspecific investigation of the shelter promoter, remains valid.
(1)

c.

D.

Note, however; that because District Court did not need to
necessarily reach the qualified amended return issue
(because it had determined a deficiency did not exist in the
first place) one could argue the District Court's opinion
related to the qualified amended return issue was merely
dicta.

Supreme Court - On October 3,2011, the Supreme Court
declined to review the case rendering the 10th Circuit opinion to be
fmal.

Jurisdictional Deposit/ Prestop Holding LLC v. United States, 106 AFTR2d
2010-7246 (Fed. Cl. 2010)
1.

Split in opinions - Split in Federal Claims Court created with J. Alegra's
opinion in Prestop Holding LLC v. United States, 106 AFTR 2d 20107246 (Fed. Cl. 2010). J. Alegra's opinion rejects 'holdings of two other
Federal Claims Court cases: Kislev Partners, L.P. ex reI. Bahar v. United
States, 84 Fed. Cl. 385 (2008), reh'g denied, 84 Fed. Cl. 378 (2008), and
Russian Recovery Fund, Ltd. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 698 (2008).

2.

Issue in Prestop - Whether the deposit requirement ofIRC §6226(e)(I)
included increases to the petitioning partner's taxes, arising from
adjustments .made in an FPAA, but payable with respect to years
subsequent to the year for which the FPAA was issued.

3.

Facts-'
l

a.

Partnership made several tax-free distributions of property in 1997
to the taxpayer/partner. The taxpayer claimed a high basis in the
distributed property.

b.

The taxpayer sold the distributed property beginning in 1998
through 2001, claiming tax' losses on the sale of the property due to
the high baSis.

c.

In 2004~ the IRS issued the partnership an FPAA for the 1997
, taxable year, the effect of which was to reduce the taxpayer's basis
in. the distributed property.

d.

In 2005, the taxpayer petitioned the Federal Claims Court,
submitting as a jurisdictional deposit $100. The ultimate purport~d
tax deficiency related to the distributed property was significantly
higher than the $100 deposited.
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E.

Legal Background
1.

IRC §6226(e)(1) provides that:
A readjustment petition under this section may be filed in a district court
of the United States or the Claims Court [Court of Federal Claims, see
§902(b), P.L. 102-572] only if the partner filing the petition deposits with
the Secretary, on or before the day the petition is filed, the amount by
which the tax liability of the partner would be increased if the treatment of
partnership items on the partner's return were made consistent with the .
treatment of partnership items on the partnership return, as adjusted by the
final partnership administrative adjustment. In the case of a petition filed
by a 5-percent group, the requirement of the preceding sentence shall .
apply to each member of the group. The court may by order provide that
the jl.!risdictionalrequirements of this paragraph are satisfied where there
has been a' good faith attempt to satisfy such requirements and any
shortfall in the amount required to be deposited is timely corrected.

2.

Unique Aspects of Partnership Adjustments
a.

Adjustments to Income, not Tax - FPAAs only propose
adjustments to individual items of income or deduction of the
partnership, but do not usually compute the taxpayer's actual tax
liability. Thus, an adjustment in an FPAA with respect to a
particular year mayor may not correlate to the partner's ultimate
tax liability for the same year.
(1)

b.

3.

Examples of situations in which an adjustment to a
partnership in one year may have tax implications for the
partner in different years include: 1) an adjustment that
reduces losses or credits that the partner can carry to other
years, or 2) an FPAA that determines the tax consequences
of a transaction in a way that does not have actual tax
impacts until later years. See,~, Kligfeld Holdings
(FPAA issued in connection with 1999 contribution by
partner to partnership, not with respect to 2000 distribution.
to partner that gave rise to tax):

One Party Files Petition for Readjustment - Section 6226 provides
that one party will file a petition for readjustment of the
partnership items, not necessarily all partners together.

Earlier Cases Opinions
a.

Kislev - Held that the jurisdictional deposit relates to not only the
year in question, but all tax effects of the adjusted items for all .
years at issue. Court relied upon the Dictionary Act (1 USC §1) to
fmd that IRC §6226(e)(1)'s "tax liability" could be interpreted as
''tax liabilities." Court also determined that taking the pqsition that
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all tax effects were included in deposit was consistent with
TEFRA's "computational adjustment" provisions, where amounts
owed by a partner for ~l years at issue can be collected from the
partner at the cQnclusion of the TEFRA proceeding without the
need to issue new Notices. Finally, the Court believed that a
taxpayer's voluntary deferral of taxes or losses into a later year
should not affect the deposit amount.
b.

F.

Russian Recovery Fund - A year after Kislev, the Court in Russion
Recovery Fund arrived at the same conclusions, based on
reasoning very similar to that in Kislev. There, the Court stated
that "we agree with Kislev and the defendant that the total tax
liability depository requirement trumps the singidar "return."
Kislev, 84 Fed. Cl. at 388. Moreover, a voluntary election to defer
losses to subsequent years should not control the deposit amount.
Allowing an entity to do so would permit it to assure itself of a
deposit-free chance to litigate by allocating the loss entirely to
other years."

Prestop Opinion
1.

Despite two recent cases in the Federal Claims Court to the contrary, J.
Alegra determined that "With all due respect to the distinguished jurists
who penned these opinions, both Kislevand Russian Recovery are
mistaken in requiring a partner to pay the total, multi-year tax liability
associated with the adjustment made in a FPAA as a precondition to
challenging that adjustment."

2.

J. Alegra rejected the reasoning ofthe Kislev and Russian Recovery .
opinions based on the following: .
a.

Rejection of Dictionary Act - J. Alegra found that the Dictionary
Act did not apply because that provision is inapplicable, by its own
terms, where the context of the statute at issue indicates that
singular terms should not be given plural effect. J. Alegra
determined that a review of that context indicated that, under
TEFRA, an FPAA will be issued with respect to.a single
partnership taxable year. Those same rules would not operate well
in a multi-year context.

b.

Rejection of Multi-Year Approach....:. The Court rejected Kislev and
Russian Recovery's adoption of a multi-year approach for
calculating the jurisdictional deposit because it was contrary to
precedent applying an annual accounting concept to federal tax
matters.
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c.

O.

Jurisdiction over Partnership Adjustments Where No Adjustment
to Income Occurs - Finally, citing prior court precedents, J. Alegra·
determined that the court has jurisdiction over a partnership
adjustment even where the FPAA does not result in an immediate
adjustment to income or deduction.

Implications
1.

Highlights how Federal Claims Court judges are not bound by opinions of
other judges on the court - only Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
opinions.

2.

Highlights distinction between J. Alegra's interpretation ofTEFRA
provision (that Congress could riot have intended that the review ofa
single FPAA would encompass all the partners' liabilities for all the
taxable years affeCted by the partnership adjustment) and the IRS' practice
of issuing an FPAA that makes no adjustments to income in the
partnership taxable year referenced. If such FPAA' s can be issued, as they
are, what purpose does the jurisdictional deposit serve?

3.

Taxpayer success in Prestop may be oflimited benefit. IRC §622S(a)
permits the assessment of a '~deficiency attributable to any partnership
item" and levy or proceeding in court to collect the deficiency at any time
after the close of the. IS0th day on which the FPAA was mailed to the Tax
Matters Partner, unless a petition is filed in the Tax Court. Nothing in IRC
§622S(a) appears to restrict such assessments to adjustments to income
related to only the FPAA'd year. Thus: it could be that paying a limited
jurisdictional deposit will afford, at most, ISO days of relief before the IRS
can proceed with a levy or action in court -to collect the remaining
deficiency for the remaining years at issue.

VIll. VALIDITY OF A PARTNERSIDP
A.

Classification of the Investor as a Partner

1.

Culbertson - In this landmark case, the Supreme Court held that the test to .
determine if a partner is treated as a partner of partnership is based on the
conduct of parties showing that they in good faith and acting with a
business purposes intended to join together in the present conduct of the
enterprise. Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the Tax CoUrt because it had not made any
findings to determine if there was a bona fide intent on the part of the
partners to be part of a partnership.
a.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the Sth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which had held that each partner must contribute either
vital services or capital to the partnership. The Sth Circuit found .
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that the intent of the partners to contribute time and services in the
future constituted sufficient grounds for recognizing a partnership
for federal income tax purposes. (Culbertson v. Comm'r, 168 F. 2d
979 (5 th Cir. 1948))
.
2.

B.

IRC Section 704(e)(1) states "A person shall be recognized as a partner for
purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in
which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not such
interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person.

Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund'2001 LP v. Commissioner
1.

Facts: The syndicators established several partnerships (coliectively, the
"Virginia Fund") to which they admitted nearly 300 investors. Although
they originally intended to give the investors interests 'that were
proportional to their investments, they ultimately gave all the investors
.01 % interests, regardless of the size of their investment. These upper tier
partnerships then invested in operating partnerships (the "Developer
Partnerships"), making capital contributions and being allocated the
Developer Partnerships' Virginia historic rehabilitation tax credits (the.
"Virginia HTC's).These credits where then allocated to the investors
based on the cash they contributed to the upper-tier partnerships. Finally,
between one to six months later, the syndicators bought out the investors
for 1/1000 of their original capital contributions.

2.

The IRS took the position that the investors should not be considered
partners, or,ifthey were partners, that the transaction should nonetheless
be considered a taxable sale (disguised sale under Section 707).

3.

Tax Court (T.C. Memo 2009-295):
a.

Holding: The Tax Court concluded that the investors should be
respected as partners making a non-taxable capital contribution,
and then getting the benefit of a loss when they sold their interests
for a tenth-of-a-penny on the dollar. It ruled that an investor could
make a tax-free capital contribution to become a partner of a '
partnership, be allocated state credits in return, and then soon'
thereafter, sell its partnership mterest for a nominal amount,
allowing the partnership to receive the funds without current tax
liability while the investor could use the state credits to pay its
state taxes, and then take a tax loss on the sale of its partnership
interest.

b.

Rationale:
(1)

The Tax Court invoked the Culbertson standards to make
its determination of whether the investors were to be
considered partners.
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(2)

Factors:
(a)

Agreement between the parties
. (i)

(b)

(c)

Found that the investors executed multiple
documents that reflected their intent to
become partners (SUbscription agreement
and partnership agreement) . .

Conduct of the parties in executing its provisions
(i)

Irivestors contributed capital to the
partnership upon execution of the
partnership d?cuments.

(ii)

Irivestors received K-ls allocating their
respective shares of credits from the
partnership pool in addition to other
partnership items.
.

(iii)

The investors had certain rights pursuant to
the partnership agreements, subscription
agreements, and option agreements under
Virginia law.

Parties' statements
(i)

(d)

Multiple investors testified at trial that they
understood themselves to be partners.

Testimony of disinterested persons
. (i)

(e)

. At trial, the Court heard testimony from
representatives of accounting and
investment firms regarding the Virginia
Program. The investors' testimony was
consistent with the professionals' testimony
regarding the details of the programs.

Relationship ~f the parties
(i)

(t)

The Court found that the parties intended to
pool their resources and share the results of
the investment.

Partners' respective abilities and capital
contributions
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(i)

(g)

Each party contributed something of value.
The investors contributed capital, while the
principals contributed both capital and
services.

Control of the income and the purposes for which
the income is used
The Court found this factor. to be neutral
because the only partnership income at issue
is based on the respondent's credit-sale
.
theory. . '

(i)

4.

4th Circuit (639 F. 3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011): The 4th Circuit reversed the Tax
Court in March 2011. The Appellate Court ruled that an allocation of state
tax credits is subject to tax at the time of allocation.

a.

The Fourth Circuit determined that the transaction should be
recharacterized as a sale of tax credits, so that the other partners of
the partnership have taxable income instead of receiving a
nontaxable capital contribution..

b.

The Fourth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the investors
were partners, and it also concluded that the state credits were
"property. "

c.

The Appellate Court reasoned that because the investor-partners
got this "property'.' within two years of their investment, the court
concluded that the regulations .under section 707 required a
presumption that the transaction was a sale, unless the investors
could prove otherwise, something the court called a "high burden."
In a step-by-step consideration of two basic tests, and five factors
all of which are found in the regulations, the court concluded that
the transaction should be treated as a sale. In concluding that (A)
the investment would not have been made if there were no transfer
of the state credits, and (B) there was no "entrepreneurial risk to
the investors," the court made the following five fmdings
(1)

Timing and amount of the transfers were "determinable
with reasonable certainty" at the time the investors made
their capital contributions;

(2)

The tratisferor had an enforceable right to get the credits
once it made its investment;

(3)

The investor's right to get the credits was "secured,";
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5;

(4)

The transfer of money was "disproportionately large" when
compared to the partners' "continuing interests in
partnerships profits"; and

(5)

The partners had no obligation to return or repay the state
credits to the partnership.

Castle Harbour3 - The set of case~ known as Castle Harbour addressed the
relationship between the. Culbertson facts and circumstances analysis of
the purported partnership relationships and the "capital interest" approach
of Section 704(e).
a.

Facts:
(1)

The Castle Harbour transaction involved an agreement
between General Electric Capital Corporation ("GECC")
and two Dutch banks to engage in the aircraft leasing
business. GECC contiibuted cash,· accounts receivable, and
sixty-three airplanes .. The two Dutch banks together
contributed cash to the partnership. Under the terms of the
partnership agreement, 98 percent of the partnership's
operating income was allocated to the Dutch banks and 2
percent was allocated to GECC. Although the contributed
aircraft.had a. tax basis of zero, their book value in the·
hands of the partnership was equal to their fair market
value. As a result, the aircraft generated large annual
depreciation deductions for book purposes but no
correspond.ing tax deductions. Thus, the taxable income of
the partnership generally exceeded its book or economic
income by an amount equal to the book depreciation
deductions. The allocation of 98 percent of the
p~ership' s operating income to the Dutch banks .
significantly reduced the tax liability of GECC while
shifting very little economic income to the Dutch banks.
As a result of the application of the so-called "ceiling ~e"
under section 704(c) of the Code (and the Treasury
Regulations thereunder), the partnership could not allocate
tax depreciation to the Dutch banks to match the book
income in question. This resulted in an overstatement of
the taxable income of the Dutch banks which essentially
allowed GECC to "re-depreciate" the 'contributed airplanes.

TIFD III-E. Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004) ("Castle Harbour I"), the original District
Court decision,; TIFD III-E. Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.2006) ("Castle Harbour II"), the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decision,; and TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LeJ9.s 93853 (D. Conn.
2009) ("Castle Harbour IIr'), the District Court decision on remand,.
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(2)

Under the tenns of the partnership agreement, the interests
of the Dutch banks were to be purchased over an 8-year
period through a self-liquidating mechanism based on the
income of the partnership. As the interests of the Dutch .~
banks were bought out, the interest of GECC would
.
correspondingly increase. The partnership agreement
provided for the payment of annual distributions to the
Dutch banks calculated to produce an internal rate of return
of approximately 9% over the 8-year period. Although
payments of these amounts by the partnership were at the
discretion of the partnership's general manager, as a
practical matter they were mandated since nonpayment
would give the Dutch banks the right to demand liquidation
of the partnership.

(3)

The partnership agreement also called for the creation of
investment accounts for the Dutch banks. Although no
cash was actually contributed to these accounts, they were
initially credited with an amount equal to the investment by
the banks and the partnership. They ,were then adjusted on
a hypothetical basis for distributions actually made to the
banks. When the banks exited from the partnership, the
balance iIi the investment accounts was to be predetermined
as if such accounts had been increased' each year by an
"applicable rate" and reduced ·by the 9 percent priority
distributions referred to above. Upon exit, the Dutch banks
were to receive a guaranteed payment if the hypothetical
amount contained in their investment accounts exceeded
the sum of operating income and disposition gain, minus
operating losses (which were capped at approximately
$4,000,000) and disposition losses (which were capped at
approximately $3,000,000) previously allocated to them.
This guaranteed payment was payable only if the banks had
not previously received net allocations of operating income
and gain sufficient to provide the specified minimum yield
on their investments. In effect, the banks were entitled to
the guaranteed payment if the balance in their investment
accounts exceeded their book capital accounts as fmally
determined.

(4)

The operating cash flow generated by the partnership
generally was applied to fund distributions, to service debt,.
and to pay expenses. The partnership agreement provided
that GECC was entitled to gruiranteed payments (the socalled "class B guaranteed payments") that were treated as
operating expenses at the partnership and did not reduce
GECC's capital account. Any cash not needed to pay
partnership distributions and expenses was transferred to a
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U.S. corporation that was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the .
partnership. Under the terms of the partnership agreement,
this subsidiary was obligated to maintain "core financial
assets;" consisting of cash and high-grade securities
(including GECC's commercial paper) equal to 110 percent
of the current value of the investment accounts of the Dutch
banks.
b.

Holdings: Castle Harbor I originally was tried in 2004. The
District Court held in favor of the taxpayer. The IRS then
appealed the case to the Second Circuit, which reversed the
decision of the District Court in part and held in favor of the
government ("Castle Harbor II"), but also remanded the case to the
District Court to address the applicability of Section 704(e) of the
Code. On remand, the District Court once again held in favor of
the taxpayer, conchiding that Section 704(e) of the Code compels·
the conclusion that the foreign banks involved in the transaction
should be treated as partners for Federal income tax purposes
("Castle Harbor III").

c.

Castle Harbour I Analysis: Held that the creation of an LLC was
not a sham designed solely to avoid taxes. While the transaction
sheltered a great deal of income from taxes, it was permissible.

d.

Castle Harbour II Analysis: The Second Circuit held that the Dutch
banks were promised a return of their investment and had no
practical risks of loss. Also, the banks potential gain was capped.
The Dutch banks were secured in such a manner that they would
be repaid in full with interest from a source to which the general
creditors had no access. According to the Appellate Court, the
apparent subordination found by the District Court was a fiction
overridden by GECC's guaranty. Castle Harbour II at p. 237.
Therefore, the Second Circuit overturned the District Court
opinion and remanded it back to the District Court to determine if
the partnership was a family partnership under Section 704(e) .

. e.

Castle Harbour III Analysis: Although the Second Circuit held that
the Bank's inte:rest was "debt-like," the District Court said that did
not mean it could not be treated as an equity interes~.

(1)

. The analysis considered whether the Bank was like a real
owner.
(a)

GECC did not control the Banks' capital, because
the Banks could force a liquidation of the
partnership.
.

(b)

The Banks participated in management.
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(c)

On certain transactions their consent was required.

(d)

The partnership treated the Banks as partners for all
purposes.

(e)

The Banks received distributions for the "sole use
and benefit" of their distributed shares of income.

. (t)
(2)

The Banks were not guaranteed a return.

Held: It is Unimportant whether a particular partners'
capital was employed, as long as overall, the partnership
used its capital to produce income. The District Court's
ultimate finding was that the Banks were partners in Castle
Harbour.

(
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